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Abstract This chapter presents in a broad perspective the links that exist between
climate and economic dynamics. We deal in particular with the inter-
actions and feedbacks that may link these two dynamical systems and
with possible approaches to modelling, and ultimately controlling, them
in order to reach a sustainable development path. The paper provides
a general introduction to the different chapters that constitute the rest
of the book.
1. Introduction
In 1896 Arrhenius predicted that CO2 released by the burning of coal, gas
and oil would accumulate in the atmosphere causing a warming of the earth’s
surface by the greenhouse effect (Arrhenius, 1896). After a further century or so
of intensive industrial, technological and scientific development, during which
global population has tripled and atmospheric CO2 has increased by around
25%, it is now recognised that warming by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
has already significantly changed the earth’s climate1, and that further damage
to climate is in store (IPCC, 2001). The purely natural dynamics of the climate
system are therefore now inexorably linked with those of the global economy.
1In a recent “multiproxy” reconstruction of monthly and seasonal surface temperature fields
in Europe the authors conclude that (Luterbacher et al., 2004):
500-year continental scale surface temperatures provide evidence of cur-
rent European climate change...the late 20th- and early 21st-century
warmth very likely exceeds that of any time during at least the past 500
years...
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Indeed, recent research has suggested that measurable human-induced climate
change may have started thousands of years earlier (Ruddiman, 2003).
Previous, natural variations of the earth’s climate revealed by geological and
ice-core records are characterised by vacillation between extensively glaciated
ice ages and relatively warm interglacials. The largest amplitude changes are
related to continental configuration on 10 to 100 million year timescales, while
the last million years or so have been dominated by a 100 000 year cycle of long
ice ages and shorter interglacials. The periodicity is related to relatively weak
changes in solar insolation resulting from variations in earth’s orbit. The effects
of these variations are amplified strongly by feedbacks in the natural climate
system in ways which are not yet well understood. Across a range of timescales
from thousands to 100’s of million years, past changes in global temperature
have been closely related to changes in CO2 concentration (Joos and Prentice,
2004), again for reasons which are not yet well understood. The introduction
of anthropogenic forcing has raised the levels of CO2 higher than at any time
in the last 400 000 years, creating a coupled system in which changes in climate
may feed back on the socio-economic system causing both monetary losses and
almost unquantifiable damage to ecosystems, while climate-induced changes in
the economy may feed back on climate change itself. This double interaction























Figure 1.1. Interactions between economic and climate systems
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The aim of this chapter is to place in a common perspective those features
of climate and economic growth dynamics which may be accessible to joint
analysis, in order to better understand the interactions and feedbacks that
exist between the two systems, and to identify, in general terms, the type
of control that could be exerted in order to maintain a sustainable or viable
development. The chapters of this edited book address in much more detail
different particular aspects that are only sketched in this introductory essay.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide a broad view of
the fundamentals of climate dynamics with a particular focus on those features
which are, or may be, accessible to integrated assessments, including the rep-
resentation of the carbon cycle which controls the concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere, the most important anthropogenic GHG. In section 3 we analyse
climate change in terms of impacts and damages and we relate these issues
to the concepts of sustainability and viability. In sections 4 and 5 we study
the drivers of economic growth in the historical period 1750-1990; we show
the relative influences of demography, technical progress, energy use, trade and
development, in the economic growth process and its consequence in terms of
increase of GHG emissions.
2. Climate dynamics
As mentioned in the introduction, the dynamics of the natural climate sys-
tem, which have included large and rapid warming events between glacial and
interglacial states, are far from well understood. These dynamics are principally
driven by incoming short-wave radiative energy from the sun (some of which is
reflected back to space) amplified by the greenhouse effect of atmospheric gases,
in which the wavelength and energy of the compensating outgoing long-wave
radiation is largely set by the very cold, upper levels of the atmosphere. The
more energetic long-wave radiation emitted by the warmer surface is effectively
trapped inside the “greenhouse”. The sun’s energy drives complex motions in
the atmosphere and oceans, which interact with the land and ocean bio- and
cryospheres via exchanges of heat, water, carbon and trace elements on a wide
variety of timescales.
Many or all of these active processes are affected by global warming, and of
relevance to human well-being and economic activity. An essential parameter
in modelling climate change and its economic impact is the so-called climate
sensitivity which describes the average surface temperature rise triggered by a
doubling of atmospheric CO2 from preindustrial levels. This parameter is not
“well constrained” in the parlance of climate modellers2. The situation is the
same for the radiative forcing due to aerosols which could have an important
mitigating effect in the short-term, potentially leading to an underestimate of
the effects of CO2 -induced warming. Overall, this leads to large uncertainties
in global warming simulations. A particularly thorny issue is the response of
2A range of 1.5o-4.5o is tentatively proposed by IPCC.
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clouds, as an increase in high cloud amplifies the greenhouse effect, but low
cloud can have the opposite effect, by reflecting short-wave radiation before it
reaches the surface.
The rational approach to the quantitative assessment of uncertainty is to
perform large ensembles of simulations (Knutti et al., 2002), but this is not
possible with detailed models, as discussed later, and furthermore the statis-
tical analysis is not trivial (Rougier, 2004). To render this hugely complex
problem tractible, the simplest possible approach is to reduce the problem to
the most fundamental and important quantities, namely the global average
surface air temperature and the atmospheric concentration of CO2 . Below we
give a brief introduction to the carbon cycle that controls the accumulation of
CO2 in the atmosphere, then consider various models of GHG-induced climate
change used for integrated assessments, starting with the simplest models which
represent the global carbon cycle by a single equation. Radiative forcing of the
atmosphere is then assumed to depend logarithmically on CO2 concentration.
2.1 A brief introduction to the carbon cycle
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations evolve according to complex dynamics de-
scribing the biogeochemical carbon cycle, which itself interacts very strongly
with the other components of the climate system including the circulation and
the hydrological cycle3. In Table 1.14 we can see the relative importance of
the different mineral and organic carbon pools on earth. Atmospheric CO2 is
exchanged with the oceans and terrestrial ecosystems. As the total dissolved
inorganic carbon in the ocean is 50 times that of the atmosphere, we can say
that in the very long run (time scale of millennia) the oceans determine at-
mospheric CO2 not vice versa. The situation is the same for temperature due
to the very high ratio of the oceanic heat capacity compared to that of the
atmosphere. Atmospheric CO2 variations are regulated by several negative
(stabilizing) feedback processes, and amplified by further, positive (destabiliz-
ing) feedback processes. Some of the negative feedbacks may be weakened or
reversed in sign by global warming. The principal CO2 feedback processes and
mechanisms are (Falkowski et al., 2000):
Surface ocean uptake. This amounts to 90 Gt of carbon per year.
When dissolved CO2 forms bicarbonate that will be buffered at a rate which is
much slower than the rate of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. So in the very long
run the ability of the surface ocean to absorb CO2 will decrease. Ocean carbon
uptake is driven by two processes, referred to as the solubility and biological
“pumps”.
3Which includes the role of clouds and ice, including sea ice.
4Partly reproduced from Falkowski et al., 2000. Note that the figures quoted are estimates
and may be affected by climate change.
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Pools Gt Residence Time
Atmosphere 760 < 10 yr
Oceans 38,400
upper part 670 10-102 yr
deep layer 36,730 103-104 yr
Lithosphere > 60,000,000 106-108 yr
Terrestrial biosphere 2,000
living biomass 800 1-102 yr
organic dead biomass 1200 1-103 yr
Fossil fuels 4,130
Table 1.1. Carbon pools in the major reservoirs on earth
The solubility pump. CO2 is more soluble in colder water, so the
strength of this process depends on the formation of cold, dense water which
sinks into the ocean interior, removing excess carbon. Models suggest a weak-
ening of the circulation which drives this process. Warmer surface waters would
add to this effect, reducing the efficiency of the pump, and giving a positive
feedback on atmospheric CO2 .
The biological pump. Phytoplankton organic photosynthesis5 contri-
butes to the absorption of CO2 from the atmosphere. The resulting organic
detritus and inorganic shell material is partially recycled by other organisms,
but some (around 25%) sinks into the interior. This biological pump depends on
complex biological, chemical and physical processes and interactions, including
the supply of nutrients6 from the deep and via wind-blown and riverine input.
The biological pump can be decomposed further into the organic, or “soft”,
and carbonate, or “hard”, biological pumps. Its behavior is hard to predict
with confidence.
Deep ocean uptake. Carbon is exchanged between surface and deep
ocean reservoirs by circulation, mixing and sedimentation. Largely due to
variations in temperature and pressure, ocean carbon concentration increa-
ses rapidly with depth. On very long (103 to 104-year) timescales deep-ocean
carbonate can precipitate7, adding to seafloor sediment, to buffer CO2 increase.
Terrestrial carbon uptake. Terrestrial ecosystems exchange CO2
rapidly with the atmosphere. CO2 is stored in living and dead organic matter
and is returned to the atmosphere through different atmospheric pathways
(respiration, fermentation, production of volatile compounds, etc). Carbon
540% of total photosynthesis.
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storage occurs primarily in forests8. The turnover time of terrestrial carbon is
on the order of decades9. A negative feedback exists at present as increased
CO2 concentrations lead to higher forest production. Increased respiration
could lead to a sign reversal of the feedback beyond some “optimal” state (
Ramade, 2002).
Other biogeochemical cycles. The carbon cycle interacts with
other biogeochemical cycles. N, P, S, oligo-elements, and eolian iron fluxes
all influence CO2 uptake. Iron fluxes have been implicated in paleoclimate
variability, and as a mechanism for macro-technological mitigation.
Other interactions and feedbacks. The strong reflectivity (albedo)
of snow and ice-covered surfaces induces a strong positive feedback on temper-
ature changes, reflecting more solar energy back to space in colder conditions.
Climatic change in peat and permafrost regions can lead to methane and CO2
release and consequently feed back on global warming. Another very impor-
tant feedback is due to water vapor which is the most important GHG: due
to greenhouse warming more water evaporates and so the concentration of
GHGs increases. However, as noted earlier, this effect can be counteracted by
increased cloud reflectivity. Ultimately the Venus syndrome illustrates an am-
plification of the greenhouse effect due to CO2 where most of the water is in the
atmosphere10 and the greenhouse effect is extreme (740 K; GHG-coeff11= 2.2).
The paleoclimate record tends to show that despite the positive feedbacks the
evolution of the climate system has allowed living species to remain in a “via-
bility envelope” through a continuous evolutive adaptation. The anthropogenic
CO2 and its speed of accumulation in the atmosphere introduce a new element
in the natural regulation of the climate system12 and this could prove to be the
most destabilizing interaction between a living species and the climate system
yet seen. In summary13:
[although]...on geological time scales the anthropogenic emissions of CO2
is a transient phenomenon... there is no natural savior waiting to as-
similate all the anthropogenic in the coming century... Potential reme-
diation14 strategies... are being seriously considered...
8Approximately 2/3 of photosynthesis on emerged surfaces.
9It is longer for the soil organic dead biomass.
10Decomposed in H2SO4, etc.
11The GHG-coeff. gives the ratio between absolute temperatures with and without GHG
effect.
12One may consider that this regulation has been effective for 3.8× 109 years.
13Again quoting Falkowski et al., 2000.
14Potential direct remediation strategies mean purposeful manipulation of biological or chem-
ical processes to accelerate the sequestration of atmospheric CO2. Because of the imprecise
knowledge of these mechanisms these manipulations could have unpredicted consequences
and should be assessed with caution.
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2.2 The carbon cycle in integrated assessment
models
A variety of models have been proposed to represent carbon cycle dynam-
ics in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). J.A. Viecelli proposed a single-
equation model in which atmospheric emissions are buffered by a deep-ocean
reservoir, which is assumed to have infinite capacity (Enting et al., 1994). The
DICE-94 model (Nordhaus, 1994) used an equivalent formulation but with al-
tered coefficients. With these specifications, a steady-state concentration level
is approached asymptotically for any constant emission level. Radiative forcing
of the atmosphere is then assumed to depend logarithmically on CO2 concentra-
tion. In the DICE-99 version of the IAM developed by W. Nordhaus (Nordhaus
and Boyer, 2000) a three-reservoir model is used to represent the exchanges that
take place between the atmosphere, the upper layer and the deep layer of the
ocean. In contrast to DICE-94, this model does not allow for capture of carbon
in any of the three reservoirs. The long-term asymptotic behavior is therefore
a steadily increasing atmospheric concentration for any non-zero emission rate.
However, even though it predicts a constant asymptotic growth of CO2 concen-
trations for any sustained emission rate, CO2 concentrations in DICE-99 can
be stabilized in the case of a steadily decreasing emissions rate.
ICLIPS (Füssel and Klein, 2004; Toth et al., 2003a; Toth et al., 2003b) is a
much more complex IAM which has been well received by the scientific commu-
nity. The model has a description of the carbon cycle with 4 reservoirs in the
atmosphere and the ocean and two reservoirs in the biosphere. This model has
been developed by the Max Plank Institute. The ICLIPS carbon cycle model
predicts a slower growth of the atmospheric CO2 concentration than DICE-
99, although it also predicts an asymptotic sustained growth for any constant
emissions level. It also suggests that, at a millennium time scale, reducing the
emissions to a level of 2 GtC per year will tend to stabilize atmospheric carbon
concentrations around 800 GtC.
The carbon cycle is only crudely represented by simple systems of a few
differential equations. Generally, climate models divide the climate system
into a grid of discrete spatial cells to represent spatial variation of properties.
To each averaged property within each cell will typically be associated one
differential equation describing the temporal variation of the property. The
larger the number of cells the more accurate the representation but also the
greater the complexity and the computational cost of the model. We discuss
more complex models with thousands or millions of cells (and equations) below.
2.3 Models of intermediate complexity
One of the most fundamental properties of the climate system is the circu-
lation of the atmosphere and oceans. Differential heating and cooling, complex
topography and, in particular, the rotation of the earth, make these circula-
tions intrinsically three dimensional and highly complex. The vast range of
spatial scales of these circulations is associated with a vast range of timescales
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from minutes to millenia, while the details of the circulation strongly affect all
other properties of the climate system. For this reason, physical climatolog-
ical research is focused on General Circulation Models (GCMs) that resolve
these 3-D flows. So far, IAMs have only used the results of high-resolution 3-D
GCMs in parameterized form. The ICLIPS model, for instance, uses impulse
response functions and scaled spatio-temporal patterns (EOFs) from two dif-
ferent GCMs. Such derived parameterizations are severely limited in their ap-
plication. They may be accurate for short-term changes, but nonlinear changes
involving significantly altered circulation states may lie outside their range of
validity, while their representation of dynamical feedbacks is limited.
Here we explicitly make the distinction between high-resolution atmosphere-
ocean (AO) GCMs such as HadCM3 (Gordon et al., 2000) and Earth System
Models of Intermediate Complexity, or EMICs. Models in the latter cate-
gory may also technically include 3-D models of the general circulation of the
ocean (C-GOLDSTEIN (Edwards and Marsh, 2004) and UVic (Weaver et al.,
2001)) or atmosphere or both (ECBILT-CLIO (Goosse et al., 2001)), although
the term GCM is often assumed to refer exclusively to high-resolution mod-
els. EMICs typically have lower spatial resolution, and are often dynamically
simplified as well, neglecting, for example dynamical atmospheric processes (
Edwards and Marsh, 2004). The number of spatial cells in C-GOLDSTEIN
is around 104 whereas high-resolution GCMs have millions of cells. The prin-
cipal advantage of EMICs is computational efficiency: the integration speed
of extant EMICs ranges from minutes (Bern 2.5-D model Knutti et al., 2002)
to days (UVic model) or weeks (ECBILT-CLIO), for a 1000-year simulation,
but high-resolution AOGCM integrations of this length would typically take
months.
Clearly, the continued development of more efficient and faithful EMICs
offers great potential to improve the representation of climate in IAMs. A
thorough review of the issues and challenges of integrated assessments, and of
the state of the art in extant models, as represented by ICLIPS, is given by
Ferenc Toth in the next Chapter of this volume. This is a rapidly developing
field, however, and in Chapter 3 of this book, an indication of possible future
developments in IAMs is given by the demonstration that an EMIC with fully
3-D ocean circulation (in this case C-GOLDSTEIN) can be incorporated ef-
fectively into an IAM with two-way coupling between climate and economic
models (in this case a version of DICE). Although this is a prototypical exam-
ple, the potential implications are clear. With a 3-D ocean, the earth’s surface,
where climate-economic interaction is localised, becomes fully two dimensional,
creating the possibility for a fully regional representation of interactions.
Against the obvious limitations of detail inherent to EMICs, the label Earth
System Model, or ESM, carries the implication that such models often include
representations of processes which are not always included in high-resolution
GCMs such as ocean biogeochemistry and sedimentation, ice-sheet dynamics
and dynamical land-surface processes. These may be highly relevant to IAMs.
For instance melting of the Greenland ice sheet in the long term may be ir-
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reversible (Toniazzo et al., 2004) while HadCM3 simulations including a dy-
namical land-surface scheme have indicated the possibility of Amazonian de-
forestation (Cowling et al., 2004). The 2003 summer drought, which had severe
socio-economic consequences, was strongly amplified by short-term soil mois-
ture effects15, while the long-term fate of excess carbon in the climate system
is effectively controlled by ocean biogeochemistry.
Efficient climate models, or EMICs, thus offer the possibility of inclusion of
important processes, regional impacts, and circulation effects, at a computa-
tional cost which is within the range of useful IAMs. The evolution of certain
types of extreme events such as a collapse of the North Atlantic ocean cir-
culation, can be directly calculated when the circulation is represented. The
analysis of such catastrophic events can lead to much more cautious policy rec-
ommendations (Wright and Erickson, 2003). Another very important potential
application of efficient models is the calculation of uncertainties via large en-
sembles of runs (Hargreaves et al., 2004). In contrast, the computational cost
of high-resolution GCMs makes it extremely difficult to asses the uncertainties
associated with their forecasts.
2.4 Climate-economy feedbacks
The justification for building integrated models of climate and economic
dynamics, beyond the convenience of joint analysis and presentation, is the
possibility of representing feedbacks between the two systems. Economic de-
velopment is a principal driver of climate change, thus the effects of climate
change on the economy, such as enhanced damages from droughts and floods,
represent a feedback on the economy. If the effects of climate on the econ-
omy lead directly, or indirectly via policy, to changes in climatic forcing factors
such as GHG emissions, then this represents a feedback of the economy on
the climate. Land-use changes represent another area of potentially important
feedback on climate via changes in surface reflectivity (albedo) and soil mois-
ture content. Such feedbacks typically involve delays across a wide range of
timescales, one of the major challenges of integrated modelling (Toth, 2004).
Global warming related to GHG emissions will take hundreds or thousands of
years to fully take effect due to the inertia of the ocean circulation and ocean
carbon cycle, whereas inertia in the socio-economic system is also important
on short timescales. On the other hand the economic system will respond to
scientific projections of future climate change, inducing what is technically a
negative delay. This effect may be difficult to incorporate in a pure simulation
IAM (ie a pure initial-value problem), but be overestimated in an optimization
model such as DICE which assumes perfect foreknowledge.
In a general system, strong delays and feedbacks may cause oscillations, or
in the case of over-reaction, (oscillatory) instability. It is therefore of interest to
ask what the strengths of the feedbacks between climate and economy may be.
15As noted by Schär et al., 2004.
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This is not necessarily an easy question to formulate. Feedbacks in the climate
system are often represented in a simplified control-theoretic form as a parallel
series of gains (Peixoto and Oort, 1992) but such an analysis may involve an
unphysical separation of processes and an inherent assumption of linearity.
Moreover, the strength of a feedback is always a function of the timescale of
the perturbation considered. As an example, we consider a modification of
the prototype IAM described in this book (Drouet et al., 2004) in which the
economy and climate are linked in cost-benefit mode (Drouet et al., 2005) and
attempt to calculate the strength of the feedback of economy on climate. One
measure of this strength is a comparison of the behaviour of the climate model
forced by an uncoupled DICE emissions scenario, with the behaviour of the
climate model in the fully coupled optimal solution. However, this difference is
not necessarily equivalent to the strength of the feedback in the coupled system.
To arrive at the latter we consider the effect of an exogenous addition of
radiative forcing, in this case by an enhancement of the solar constant (the
average solar forcing) by 4 Wm−2. The feedback strength will be the degree of
reduction of this exogenous forcing by the coupled system, compared with the
effect of such an additional forcing on the uncoupled climate (given the emis-
sions relating to the unperturbed coupled solution). The feedback strength is a
function of timescale, but we can at least calculate it for a given perturbation,
initially an impulsive change in solar forcing. The result is shown in Figure 1.2.
The increase in solar forcing leads to a significant, additional warming of around
0.4 C, which is reduced by the response of the economy. This reduction is de-
layed, and at 200 years amounts to about 0.04 C, or a 10% reduction of the net
additional warming.
2.5 Asymptotic goals for climate change control
Investigating policy options consistent with acceptable sustainability is the
main motivation for integrated assessment modelling. Figure 1.3, reproduced
from Edwards and Marsh, 2004, shows the response of an ensemble of runs
of the EMIC C-GOLDSTEIN to a single, illustrative scenario in which CO2
equivalent GHG concentrations in the atmosphere increase at a constant rate
of 1% per year for 100 years then remain constant. The figure shows the mean
surface air temperature for the forced warming period and for the following
1000 years. The spread is due to uncertainty in model parameters. Of interest
is the increase of SAT after model year 2100 when GHG concentration is held
constant. The implication of this increase is that realistic analyses of sustain-
ability will have to reckon with continued increases in global temperature, and
associated increasing global change, resulting from inertia in the physical sys-
tem. In this particular model ensemble experiment, the increase in SAT in the
200 years immediately following the cessation of emissions is around 1/2 degree
C per hundred years. Changes of a similar order are believed to have occurred
during the last 500 years (Luterbacher et al., 2004) but future changes will take
place in the context of a previously unknown, anthropogenically warmed world.
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Figure 1.2. The effect of the feedback of economy on climate in the IAM of ?. The
lower line is the unperturbed solution of the cost-benefit optimisation, the middle line
is the solution under perturbed forcing (increased solar constant), the uppermost line is
the response to perturbed forcing of climate with no feedback from economy to climate.
The feedback reduces the warming by 10% at 200 years.
Similar behaviour is observed in simulations of global warming using high-
resolution GCCMs, as summarised by the IPCC (IPCC, 2001). These models
consistently predict a sensible long-term climate impact of anthropogenic CO2
emissions. We notice that the stabilization scenario (with a target temperature
increase of 1.5 degree C) asks for a drastic reduction of CO2 emissions by the
end of the century. This is consistent with the report in Enting et al. where
a variety of carbon cycle models have been used to define the evolution of
emissions that would lead to a stabilizing of the atmospheric CO2 concentration;
they consistently lead to an asymptotic 2GtC/yr emission rate to be reached
by year 2100 (Enting et al., 1994). Results from the full range of available
models therefore predict severe climate change in the long run if the CO2
emissions are not curbed. However the climate system has considerable inertia
and, therefore, the current generations will not witness all the impacts of their
economic decision to (or not to) curb CO2 emissions. On the other hand,
if GHG emissions continue unabated, the temperature and sea-level changes
predicted for the next millennium greatly exceed those of the next hundred
years (Hasselman et al., 2003). Over a time horizon of a century, our societies
should be able to reduce considerably the yearly emissions of carbon in the
atmosphere, probably to a level around 2GtC/y, which is very low in comparison
with the current level (around 8 GtC in 2004). In the next section we consider
the question of sustainability in more detail from a socio-economic perspective.
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Figure 1.3. Global average surface air temperatures for an ensemble of simulations of
the EMIC C-GOLDSTEIN. CO2 is forced to increase at 1% per year for 100 years then
kept constant. The lower panel is an enlargement. The spread is due to uncertainty
in model parameters.
3. Sustainability
Anthropogenic climate change is an archetypal issue for sustainable develop-
ment. In this section we explore the most important linkages that exist between
climate and societies. We first revisit the concepts of sustainability and viabil-
ity which propose an analytic framework to study such interactions. We then
focus on the impacts that can be expected from climate change and we discuss
the relative importance of mitigation and adaptation in the societal response
to a climate change threat.
3.1 Sustainability and viability
Sustainable development is generally defined as
... paths of social, economic and political progress that meet the needs
of the present without compromising or endangering the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.
This heuristic definition, self-adjusted to human activities, corresponds to an
ethical management of the earth resources (responsibility, equity, solidarity be-
tween generations or social groups and territories, respect of ecological equilib-
ria, prevention, precaution). This programme is clearly not realized currently in
any part of the world. Since palaeolithic times “global” sustainability has been
achieved at the expense of the transformation or disappearance of local cultures
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and civilizations. Consequently, the biosphere, ecosystems and environment16
have been modified and this has changed the burden of human activity on the
local resources. The proposal to implement a global and local sustainability is
therefore an ambitious challenge that has never been realized before in human
history.
A scientific approach to sustainable development calls for a deep understand-
ing of the structure and dynamics of the biosphere-society-environment system.
The study of the coupling between climate and economic dynamics is part of
this endeavor. The scientific approach should be accompanied by an axiology
that will have some effects on cultural values. This would trigger socio-economic
actions compatible with a high quality human life in a heterogenous cultural
perception by different societies17. Deep knowledge of the structure and dy-
namics of the systems composing the triad biosphere-society-environment is
necessary for the design of a global management toward real and progressive
sustainability during this century. Many indicators or variables have been pro-
posed to describe and analyse the complex socio-economic, environmental and
ecological networks that sustain human life and societal organization. Since
these variables don’t all share the same significance a hierarchy could be made
to first identify the most limiting factors for a sustained, secured and robust life
viability of human species (and of the rest of biosphere.) This would define vi-
ability envelopes18 which would dictate the long-term mitigation or adaptation
absolutely necessary for a sustainability policy at the socio-economic, biosphere
and environmental levels. The earlier the detection of such a hard limit the
lower will be the cost to mitigate or to adapt (Schellnhuber and Wenzel, 1998).
3.2 Climate change impacts
How will the economic system be impacted by climate change? Among
the different economic sectors, agriculture is certainly one of the most directly
linked with climatic conditions. Other sectors may also suffer from output
losses when temperature and precipitations change, and some may gain. We
briefly review these impact evaluations.
3.2.1 Agriculture. Since the Neolithic times (10’000 years ago),
agricultural activities have been the main factor of economic and social progress
in terms of security and organization. Recently, as a result of scientific and in-
dustrial progress, this activity has evolved rapidly and has considerably trans-
formed the natural ecosystems and landscape of the world. More than a third
16Biomass, biodiversity, food and other resources, climate, etc.
17From equi-finality to sustainability.
18At the limit one could consider viability in a more restricted sense: “alive or dead” for
human population and ecosystems. This would correspond to the minimal platform for
viability. Some sentinel variables like mean life expectancy, biodiversity , biomass evolution,
temperature, water variation, surface concentrations in O2, CO2 , CH4, etc, could be used
to delineate these envelopes (Greppin et al., 2002).
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of land is utilized for agriculture (47% if we exclude deserts and high altitudes).
To sustain the photosynthetic activity agriculture needs large surfaces to access
light, a considerable flux of water19, CO2 , nitrogen, phosphate, sulfate, potas-
sium, etc., as well as a soil of high quality. The influence of climate is therefore
significant, and this whatever the state of economic development of the region
concerned. Between 1650 and 2000, the world population has increased by
1100%, to reach 6.4×109 inhabitants, the agricultural surface has increased
by 500% (crop cultures 1.5×107 km2, pastures 3.3×107 km2) and a limit is
imposed by the necessity to maintain sufficient forest areas. The decrease in
per capita arable land has been compensated by a considerable increase of the
yield (300 to 600 %). Despite its overall capacity to offer sufficient per capita
feeding (4.6 GJ/y/h), a fraction of the population (0.8×109 people) remains
chronically undernourished and a quarter of the world population is affected
by food insecurity even in the absence of climate change.
A great diversity characterizes the importance of the agriculture sector in
different countries: from 2 to 40% of GDP, 3 to 70% of working population,
consumption of 0.5 to 80% of the natural flux of water. Over the last 40 years
irrigation has progressed by 110%, 40% of the crop production comes from the
16% of land which is irrigated, although 64% of crop surfaces are in developing
countries where 2/3 of the world population lives with only 1/4 of the annual
rainfall. The use of fertilizers and pesticides has considerably increased, accom-
panied by pollution effects. About 40% of the arable land is degraded to some
degree. The mechanization, fertilizer and energy use contribute to GHG forc-
ing. The great sensitivity of the agro-ecosystem to climatic change is amplified
by yield management practices and by its insulation from neighbouring ecosys-
tems (Alexandratos, 1995; P.A. Matson, 1997; Reilly and Schimmelpfenning,
1999). Agricultural vulnerability in respect of predicted climate change could
be very variable according to the area of the globe that is concerned. Crop
cultivation capacity may increase in North America (Alaska, Canada, Eastern
USA) and Europe (in particular Russia), as well as in South-East Asia (China,
Indonesia), African and South American equatorial regions, and some Eastern
regions of South America. The loss could be severe in other regions, especially
in developing countries. Agriculture will gain in strategic importance for eco-
nomic growth, access to territorial space, and the global security of nations (
Fisher et al., 2002).
3.2.2 More general impacts. Other economic sectors than agri-
culture may be directly affected by climate change: tourism and also energy
production are very much climate dependent (heat waves may impact both on
electricity demand and power supply20. More generally the GHG climate forc-
ing will modify the earth’s landscape at all scales (spatial and temporal) as it
19Around 700 t of water are necessary to produce 1 t of organic food.
20The Summer 2003 heat wave in France triggered a decline in nuclear power supply because
of cooling failures. It also triggered a rush to air conditioning and an increase in demand.
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will change the distribution of dynamic climatic conditions. This will trigger
a redistribution of environmental risks such as strong winds, hurricanes, fires,
floods, drought, desertification, landslides, lightning, ecosystem biotic pertur-
bations by pests and pathogens, etc. All these perturbations have economic
consequences.
According to the different scenarios proposed by IPCC (SRES scenarios),
and simulated by HadCM3, CSIRO and NCAR, the following changes are pos-
sible: in the northern hemisphere the global warming could provoke a northward
shift in thermal regime and, as a consequence, a significant reduction (around
60 %) of boreal and arctic ecosystems. A large expansion of temperate climate
area in Siberia, Canada and Alaska may occur, accompanied by an extension
of the forest fire season in the boreal part (risks of severe forest fires). Soil
respiration could be stimulated (GHG source). In the southern hemisphere,
however, the temperate zone of Argentina and Chile may disappear almost
completely. The subtropical zone would keep its extent. A major expansion
may occur in the tropical zone that will cover most of Africa. The diminution
of the thermal difference between the poles and the equator would affect the
oceanic and continental water balance (evaporation and precipitation zones).
A large drying of the extended Mediterranean basin, South Africa and Western
Australia, and part of Eastern Brazil and central America may be envisaged.
This diminution of precipitation in the intertropical zone would be compensated
by more humidity in higher latitudes (Scandinavia for example) and in the Pa-
cific ocean. In general this would result in an increase of arid areas, mostly
in developing countries. At a more local scale, the impact of global warming
is more uncertain and difficult to predict. The changes in rainfall patterns in
addition to shifts in thermal regimes would influence the local, seasonal and
annual water balance. Probably in many regions one could observe a change in
the frequency of occurrence of extreme events (intensive rainfall, gales, floods,
snow-stones-mud avalanches, etc...).
3.3 To mitigate or to adapt?
Given the level of past emissions and the inertia of the climate and economic
systems, some degree of climate change cannot be prevented. Adaptation to
climate change is therefore an issue (Füssel et al., 2003). There are still di-
vergent views on whether climate change will seriously affect society. Some
authors identify a set of fundamental characteristics of natural systems to be
taken into consideration to analyse adaptation strategies (Reilly and Schim-
melpfenning, 2000). They are: Short-term autonomous flexibility; short-term
non-autonomous flexibility; knowledge and capacity to undertake short-term
actions; long-term autonomous flexibility; long-term non-autonomous flexibil-
ity; and knowledge and capacity to plan for and undertake adaptations that
require changes in long-lived assets. Adaptation is certainly a significant soci-
etal issue that should be an important part of the climate research agenda in the
coming years. We can relate the choice between mitigation and adaptation to
the different time scales involved in the dynamics of the climate and economic
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systems. Climate change is a long lived phenomenon; reducing emissions today
will not prevent some warming; therefore the mitigation activities are to be
inscribed in a long-term environmental policy. The dynamics of climate change
assures that some warming and precipitation changes are already under way
and that strong impacts will be effective at the end of the century. So, during
this century the economy will have to adapt to the new climatic conditions.
Some adaptation decisions will have to be taken on a much shorter time scale,
as different societies will sense the changes in climate variables and assess their
vulnerability to these changes.
3.4 Sustainability, viability and
Intergenerational Equity
The very long time horizon and the slow time scale associated with climate
change dynamics offer a new challenge to economists when they try to imple-
ment a cost-benefit analysis in the management of the global commons. The
fundamental question addressed in these analyses is (Chao and Peck, 2000):
“How much and who pays”?
The archetypal cost-benefit analysis model is DICE-94 (Nordhaus, 1994) or its
close descendant DICE-99 (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). In these models, the
driver of the economic systems is the maximization of a discounted sum of the





where ρ is the pure time preference rate, L(t) is the population level, and U(c(t))
is the utility derived from per-capita consumption level c(t). In the economic
growth paradigm the economic output can be used for consumption or capital
accumulation. However emissions abatement and climate change both induce
a loss of output. The representative economic agents have thus to trade-off
consumption today versus investment for consumption tomorrow but also loss of
output due to climate change versus loss of output due to abatement. Because
these decisions imply a comparison between consuming today and consuming
at a future date, the discounting factor e−ρt is introduced in the criterion.
The choice of the parameter ρ has a considerable influence on the asymptotic
behavior of the economic growth model. The asymptotic steady states of the
DICE-94 model have been compared for values of ρ ranging from 021 to 10 %
(Haurie, 2002). The asymptotic level of capital would be 3 times higher in the
ρ = 0 case than in the 10 % case. The GHG concentrations would be 50 %
higher in the 10 % case than in the ρ = 0 case. Sustainable consumption will
be 10 % higher when ρ = 0 than when ρ = 10 %. So, in brief, discounting
21One can easily overcome the difficulty of dealing with a nonconvergent integral in (1.1)
when ρ = 0.
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induces a long-term economy which is less equipped, more polluted and which
consumes less. This is an illustration of the thorny issue of discounting and
intergenerational equity discussed by a group of eminent economists (Portney
and Weyant, 1999). Even though a low discount rate seems more attractive in
the long run, no rational economic agent will accept the proposal to base its
investment decision on 0-discount rate.
Chichilnisky has introduced an axiomatic for the decision rules that would
avoid both dictatorship of the present and dictatorship of the future22. Accord-







e−ρtL(t)U(c(t)) dt + (1− β)Φ(c(∞))
￿
(1.2)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and Φ(c(∞)) is a utility associated with the very long-term
(asymptotic) per-capita consumption rate. However, the use of this criterion
would lead to a decision path which is not time-consistent (Lecocq, 2000). This
criterion will commit forthcoming generations to use a decision criterion which
does not correspond to their rate of time preference. A solution to this difficulty
has been hinted at by Arrow (Arrow, 1999) who formulated a noncooperative
game among successive generations of economic agents23. This idea has been
exploited in different articles where intergenerational equity is obtained through
the computation of an intergenerational equilibrium, which, by definition does
not commit the decisions of forthcoming generations but assumes that they will
share the same level of altruism as the current generation (Lecocq, 2000; Haurie,
2003; Haurie, 2004). Also one assumes that the current generation takes into
account, in its utility function, the well-being of forthcoming generations24.
4. Demographics, economic development and
GHG emissions
As explained in section 2, the net global GHG emissions to the atmosphere
must eventually decline substantially to maintain any stable steady-state at-
mospheric carbon concentration. To estimate the GHG emissions reduction
effort and to assess the associated economic costs, one has first to evaluate
the global future GHG emission levels if nothing is done. However this future
is highly uncertain (IPCC, 2000). Almost all driving forces are controversial:
long-term population growth, economic growth, technological change; fossil-fuel
reserves; non-climate environmental policies, etc. The controversy concerns not
only the dynamics of each variable, but also their mutual interactions (between
economic growth and population; technological change and economic growth;
22See Chichilnisky, 1996 and Chichilnisky et al., 2000.
23Arrow referred to a formalism proposed long ago (Phelps and Polak, 1968) to represent
selfishness in a multigeneration investment process.
24For a more detailed analysis of the technical aspects of these new classes of criteria that
have to be introduced when economics has to deal with the very long lived effects of current
decisions concerning climate change, see Ambrosi et al., 2003.
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technological change and fossil-fuel reserves, etc.) In this section, we revisit
the IPCC projections for carbon emissions from fossil fuels25. We focus on the
key assumptions in GHG emissions for these scenarios and address the uncer-
tainty concerning the main driving forces in the dynamics of carbon emissions.
We then compare the IPCC scenarios with historical trends for the 1750-1990
historical period. To decompose the effect of demographic, economic, and tech-
nological dynamics and transitions on the evolution of global CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels, we use the Kaya identity26. In other words, total world CO2
emissions at time t depend on per capita emissions and population. In its turn,
the per capita CO2 emission rate can be decomposed into (i) per capita GDP
and (ii) CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (GHG emission/GDP intensity factor).
Finally, one can decompose the intensity factor defined as the ratio GHG emis-
sion/GDP into two subcomponents (i) the energy/GDP intensity and (ii) the
emissions per energy unit that reflects the GHG emission intensity of energy
consumption.
4.1 Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels
In 1992 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released
six emissions scenarios providing alternative GHG emissions trajectories over
the 1990-2100 period (Leggett et al., 1992)27. It has been argued that, for the
purposes of driving atmospheric climate models, the CO2 emissions trajecto-
ries of the IS92 scenarios provide a reasonable reflection of variations found
in the open literature(Alcamo et al., 1995). Other analysts have noted that
25In 1992 and 2000 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released al-
ternative GHG emissions scenarios over the 1990-2100 period (Leggett et al., 1992; IPCC,
2000). These scenarios embodied a wide array of assumptions affecting how future GHG
emissions might evolve in the absence of new climate change policies. The different emissions
projections reflect contrasted assumptions in terms of economic, social and environmental
conditions.









where C, E, Y , P stand for world CO2 emissions from fossil fuels in metric tons of carbon,
final energy consumption in tons of oil equivalent, GDP in 1990 U.S. dollars, and popu-
lation, respectively. Data on C are based on United Nations estimates of national energy
consumptions (Marland et al., 1999). Data on P and E are from the International Energy
Agency (IEA/OECD) and other studies (Kremer, 1993; Darmstadter, 1971; Etemad et al.,
1991). Data on Y are real GDP for the world at purchasing power parity estimates in 1990
international dollars (Maddison, 1995).
27The IPCC scenario “IS92a” represented an average situation with medium population and
economic growth, and access to a mix of conventional and renewable energy sources. The
highest carbon emissions IPCC scenario “IS92e” used, among other assumptions, moderate
population growth, high economic growth, high fossil fuel availability and possible phasing-
out of nuclear power. At the other extreme, “IS92c” has a CO2 emissions path that eventually
falls below its 1990 starting level. It assumes that the population is growing initially and
then declines by the middle of the century, it also assumes a low economic growth and severe
constraints on fossil fuel supply (see figure 1.4).
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the IPCC growth assumptions were generally conservative (Eckaus, 1994) and
that emissions forecasts based on recent historical patterns give much higher
worldwide CO2 emissions than predicted in the IPCC IS92 emission scenarios
(Schmalensee et al., 1998).
In its 2000 report on emissions scenarios (IPCC, 2000), the IPCC proposes
four alternative scenario “families”, or “storylines”, describing different GHG
emissions futures based on contrasted dynamic changes and transitions. The
IPCC does not put any particular order among the storylines. The main charac-
teristics of the four IPCC-SRES scenario families are presented in Table 1.428.
As shown in Figure 1.4, the new IPCC-SRES emissions projections are in a
lower range compared with the IS92 scenarios. The IPCC projects the high-
est carbon emissions from fossil fuels (27.5 GtC in 2100) in scenario “A2” by
assuming high population and energy growth combined with medium GDP
growth. For the low population and energy-growth scenarios “B1”, worldwide
carbon emissions are projected to come back more or less to the 1990 level by
2100. In the average scenarios “A1B” and “B2”, the emissions trajectories vary
greatly but converge to a level around 15 GtC/y in 2100.

































Figure 1.4. Comparison of global CO2 emissions forecasts for the IPCC IS92 scenar-
ios
28The IPCC report is based on simulation results coming from six different economic models.
We use the average of the six models’ projections for comparison purposes.
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Table 1.2. Characteristics of the IPCC-SRES storylines
Scenario Group A1B A2 B1 B2
Population growth low high low medium
GDP growth very high medium high medium
Energy use very high high low medium
Land-use changes low medium/high high medium
Fossil-fuels availability medium low low medium
Technological change rapid slow medium medium
Change favoring balanced regional efficiency & “dynamics
dematerialization usual”
4.2 Demographics and CO2 emissions
The growth in worldwide carbon emissions results from population growth
and the evolution of per capita emissions. As shown in Figure 1.5, the world
population cannot be simply extrapolated from historical population patterns.
The world population multiplied by two in 150 years between 1700 and 1850
(+0.45% per annum) and multiplied by 5 in 150 years between 1850 and 2000
(+1.1% per annum). The theory of the demographic transition states that pop-
ulation might stabilize at a high living standard as a result of fertility decline
and a high life expectancy at birth. But the speed and extent of this demo-
graphic transition is difficult to predict. If we consider the fertility rate of 2.1
children per woman as corresponding to the replacement level, in conditions
of low mortality (life expectancy around 70 years), in 2003, about 50% of the
world population is in that situation or below this rate (15% under 1.5)29. A
great diversity in fertility exists in the developing world where the demographic
transition is not reached for the moment: 32% of the world population ranges
between the rate of 3 to 6 children per woman (i.e. northern India, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Arabian Peninsula, sub-saharan Africa). Most future growth will
be produced in these areas (Baldwin, 1998). Because of this uncertainty, the
IPCC retains three contrasted population trajectories that reflect future demo-
graphic uncertainty (see Figure 1.5).
Historical per capita emission patterns are plotted in Figure 1.6. Not sur-
prisingly, per capita emissions increased very rapidly with the early stage of
industrial development. At the world level, per capita emissions have tended
to grow over the entire period30. However, industrialized countries have had
a two-phase pattern for per capita emissions (Lanne and Liski, 2003). The
first phase was characterized by fast growth of per capita emissions as early
industrialization and development was heavily based on coal (1750-1910). The
second phase showed a lower growth of per capita emissions due to the change
29See Wilson, 2004.
30The reduction of per capita emissions at the world level in the end period is mainly due
to the sharp decline in per capita emissions associated with the economic recession in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.
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Figure 1.5. Global population
in the fuel mix (i.e. the shift from coal to oil and gas), and to technological
progress. By contrast, there is little historical evidence for a third phase charac-
terized by declining per capita emissions. However, one finds evidence for early
downturns in per capita trends in developed countries in the first decade of the
20th century (Lanne and Liski, 2003). Figures 1.5-1.6 show that the medium
emission scenarios “A1B” and “B2” are based on different assumptions about
population and per capita emission growth. The “A1B” scenario combines
low population growth with high per capita emission coefficient whereas the
“B2” scenario is built on medium population and per capita growth. The low
emissions scenario “B1” is explained by a sharp decline of population and per
capita emissions from 2050. The high-growth scenario “A2” assumes medium
per capita emission growth but high population growth. As defined by the
IPCC, scenario “A2” might be considered as a rather pessimistic scenario.
However, one might imagine a similar scenario in terms of emission forecast
based on the U.N. medium population scenario used for the “A2” scenario and
a per capita emissions forecast that would fit with historical patterns used in
scenario A1B. This “conservative” scenario would give emissions from fossil
fuels totalling 22 GtC/y by 2100.
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Figure 1.6. CO2 emissions per capita (scenario A1B)
4.3 CO2 emissions and economic growth
Most research concerning the relationship between the environment and eco-
nomic growth uses the paradigm of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)31.
A number of studies have cautioned the EKC hypothesis on theoretical grounds
(Arrow et al., 1995; Stern et al., 1996). Others have criticized the EKC model
on econometric grounds (Stern and Common, 2001; Stern et al., 1996). It
has been shown that environmental improvements are possible in developing
countries and that pollution peaks might be lower than in early developed
countries32. This indicates that EKC curves may shift down for developing
countries, and that emissions may decline simultaneously in low and high in-
come countries over time33. The existing literature shows little evidence for
a common inverted U-shaped curve that countries follow as their income rises
(Stern, 2003). In the CO2 case one observes that per capita emissions have
tended to rise with per capita gross domestic product (GDP) but to stabilize
31The EKC is an empirical proposition according to which an indicator of environmental
degradation is an inverted U-shaped function of income per capita (Grossman and Krueger,
1991; IBRD, 1992). It basically says that in the early stage of economic growth environmental
degradation and pollution increase, but beyond some level of income per capita the trend
reverses and the environment indicator improves with structural changes in the economy, the
development of better technology, changes in the fuel mix, and the enforcement of stricter
environmental regulations.
32See Dasgupta et al., 2002.
33The income elasticity of emissions is likely to be less than one but hardly negative in
wealthy countries as proposed by the EKC literature.
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or even reverse in highly developed countries from 1950 to 1990 (Schmalensee
et al., 1998). As shown in Figure 1.7, there is a regular increase of per capita
emissions with per capita GDP at the world level over the 1750-1990 period.
Two IPCC scenarios are consistent with the EKC hypothesis: on average, the
six models used for evaluation of scenario “A1” and scenario “B1” find a turn-
ing point in 2080 and 2040-50, respectively. In scenario “A2” and “B2”, per
capita CO2 emissions are projected to increase monotonically with per capita
income. The income elasticity of emissions is supposed to be close to one in
“A2” and approximately 0.4 in B2 by 2100.
































Figure 1.7. CO2 emissions and GDP Growth (1800-2100)
The decomposition of per capita carbon emissions into carbon intensity of
GDP and per capita income is presented in Figure 1.8. At the world level,
per capita emissions have increased as a result of the two components from
1800 to 1910. The carbon intensity of GDP reached a peak in 1910, and then
reduced from 1910 to 1990 by 1.2 % per year. The reduction of carbon inten-
sity has been too low to compensate the effect of income growth on per capita
emissions. The EKC model assumes implicitly that the growth in per capita
income can be more than compensated by a decline in carbon intensity of GDP.
This hypothesis is easier to support if one supposes that income growth were
to decline over time, and that the economy should be in steady state in the
long run34. The IPCC emission scenarios are built on assumptions of declin-
34This kind of reasoning, assuming an exogenous rate of technological progress, has been
introduced by Ramsey and Solow , and popularized by the neo-classical optimal growth theory
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ing GDP growth rates. This has been criticized by some experts who believe
that IPCC’s growth assumptions are generally conservative in light of recent
experience, and that there is no historical basis for the common assumption
that per capita income growth slows down over time in developed countries35.
Indeed, the exchange rates approach overstates the income gap between rich
and poor countries in the base year. As a result, the IPCC may assume too
high economic growth in poor countries as per capita income may be expected
to converge in the long run. However, the choice of the market exchange rates
approach does not necessarily lead to an overestimation of developing countries’
emission growth if one expects a closure of the emission intensity gap between
rich and poor countries with the convergence of per capita income among coun-
tries. This latter driving force may well compensate the bias in GDP growth (
Manne and Richels, 2003).

































Figure 1.8. Decomposition of CO2 per capita (1800-2100). The straight lines are
contours of constant per capita emission rate.
(Ramsey, 1928; Solow, 1956). By contrast, endogenous growth models are characterized by
increasing return to scale and generate sustained growth over long periods of time (Lucas,
1988; Romer, 1990).
35For example, see Eckaus, 1994; Nordhaus, 1994; Schmalensee et al., 1998. Other experts
have also criticized the IPCC emission scenarios for using GDP weights based on exchange
rates rather than purchasing power parities (Castles and Henderson, 003a; Castles and Hen-
derson, 003b).
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5. Energy and economic development
Several authors have also used a decomposition approach to analyse changes
in carbon emissions in industrialized countries into structural (e.g. output mix),
technological and fuel mix effects (Selden et al., 1999; Viguier, 1999; Schipper
et al., 2001). These studies show that the reduction of energy intensity has
played a major role in the decline of carbon intensity as compared to the fuel
composition effects and structural changes in the economy36. The comparison
of modelling results shows that none of the projections expect a decline in
carbon intensity of fuels, similar to the historical rate, to continue beyond 2020
(Viguier et al., 2003). At the world level, GHG emission intensity has been
caused by a continuing reduction of energy intensity since 1910 (see Figure 1.8).
The carbon intensity of energy consumption has been very stable in the whole
period 1800-1990. However, one can see on the graph that all IPCC’s scenarios
except the “A1B” scenario assume a sharp decline in emissions due to rapid
energy substitutions from carbon intensive energy (e.g. coal) to less-carbon
intensive energy or carbon-free energy. Can we expect such a change in the
composition of fuel consumption in a baseline emission scenario? Will energy
intensity continue to decrease over time without new environmental policies?
Most economic models include exogenous technical change represented as a
single scaling factor – the autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI)
– that makes aggregate energy use per unit of output decline over time, in-
dependently of any changes in energy prices. Although the definition of the
AEEI varies from model to model, in all models it implicitly represents the
effect of technological progress. In some models it also represents one or both
of two additional trends: (1) changes in the structure of the economy, result-
ing in a shift in the relative contribution of energy-intensive industry output
to total economic output; and (2) an improvement in energy efficiency over
time, reflecting the gradual removal of market barriers that prevent some en-
ergy consumers from choosing more efficient energy technologies. In reality,
higher prices do spur greater innovation and more rapid diffusion of energy-
saving technologies (Huntington and Weyant, 2002). AEEI is critical because
even small rates (e.g. 1% per year) can generate large reductions in energy use
and carbon emissions when applied over a long time horizon. However, it is
not clear what an appropriate rate for AEEI should be.
The extent to which technical change is energy-saving is a source of con-
siderable controversy (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993). Hogan and Jorgenson
present econometric evidence that aggregate technical change may be slightly
energy-using (Hogan and Jorgenson, 1991). Modelling technical change with a
36For example, it is shown that the reduction of the carbon intensity of US GDP has been
mostly due to the reduction of energy intensity (Viguier et al., 2003). In Europe, both the
decline of energy intensity and the evolution of the fuel mix are responsible for a falling
emissions intensity of GDP for the 1960-1995 period. Historically a decline in the carbon
intensity of fuels has been a significant contributor to the decline in carbon intensity of GDP
for the EU.
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deterministic trend may also overestimate future AEEI. A deterministic trend
implies that AEEI will continue ad infinitum. However, one should model tech-
nical change as a stochastic process and account for the limits on the structural
changes responsible for AEEI (e.g. the ability of households to substitute non-
energy goods and services for energy purchases; resource and technical limits
on the ability to reduce energy intensity) (Kaufmann, 2004). One should better
represent technological change by incorporating some degree of price sensitivity
(Huntington and Weyant, 2002). Recent econometric studies that take into ac-
count the presence of price-induced technical change and the stochastic nature
of technical change conclude that current estimates for AEEI may overstate
future reductions in energy use and thus underestimate the welfare effect of
climate change policies (Kaufmann, 2004).
In the IPCC scenarios “A1B”, “B1”, and “B2”, the reduction of carbon
intensity of energy consumption is generally obtained through a shift from
fossil fuel to biomass and carbon-free energy. But the fuel-by-fuel composition
of energy consumption may greatly differ from one economic model to another.
In general, the projected fuel mix is characterized by less coal and oil, and a
high share for natural gas and renewable energy in the three scenarios37 by
2100. By contrast, Manne and Richels have included new assumptions about
oil and gas resources in the MERGE model38. In the reference case where
a production-reserve ratio of 5% and a resource depletion factor of 2% are
assumed, world oil and gas production are supposed to decline to 87.6 and
101.3 exajoules (EJ) per year in 2100, respectively. As shown in Figure 1.9,
almost fifty percent of total primary energy supply would come from coal, and
oil and gas would represent around 6% each. This picture is relatively different
from all the IPCC’s scenarios. Under this fuel mix, the decline of carbon
intensity of energy consumption might be more limited than expected in IPCC
scenarios depending on the penetration of new clean-coal technologies.
As a final remark we may notice that baseline emissions scenarios produced
by the economic models generally assume (i) a rapid shift from fossil fuels
to carbon-free energy in the baseline scenario, and (i) constant AEEI rates
which are typically in the range 0.5% to 2.5% per year. If one challenges
these underlying assumptions, GHG emission intensity might be higher than
projected by the IPCC. Ceteris paribus, worldwide carbon emissions might
then be higher than one might expect from the IPCC – or closer to the “A2”
scenario than the others. ’Consequently, both the environmental burden and
37If one takes the IPCC projections from the Asian-Pacific Integrated (AIM) model as an
example, the share of oil in total primary energy supply is supposed to reduce to 6% in “A1B”
and to 12% in “B1” in 2100; the share of coal ranges from 10% to 13%; natural gas ranges
from 10% to 25% and renewable energy goes from 21% in “B2” to 44% in “A1B”.
38They estimate oil and gas supply curves by 2100 based on estimates of the quantities of
conventional oil, gas, and natural gas liquids outside the United States that have the potential
to be added to reserves in the next 30 years (1995 to 2025) from the U.S. Geological Survey
“World Petroleum Assessment 2000”.
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the economic and the economic costs of mitigation policies (i.e. Kyoto targets)
tend to be underestimated.
























Figure 1.9. Fuel Shares in Total Primary Energy Supply (MERGE 5 - Reference
case)
6. Conclusion
To summarize this rapid survey of the interplay between climate and eco-
nomic dynamics we may draw the following conclusions:
Knowledge of the dynamics of the carbon cycle and the forcing by green-
house gases permits us to predict global climate change due to anthro-
pogenic influences on a time scale of a century (albeit with uncertainty).
Stabilizing the global mean temperature change to a level around 2oC
calls for a drastic worldwide reduction of the GHG emissions level (to
around a quarter of the 1990 level) over the next 50 years.
Climate inertia implies that those who will benefit (suffer) most from our
mitigation actions (lack of mitigation) are not yet born.
The climate change impacts may be large and unequally distributed over
the planet, with a heavier toll for some DCs.
The rapid rise of GHG emissions has accompanied economic development
since the beginning of the industrial era; new ways of bypassing the
Kuznets curve phenomenon have to be found for permitting DCs to enter
into a necessary global emissions reduction scheme.
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The energy system sustaining the world economy has to be profoundly
modified; there are possible technological solutions but their implemen-
tations necessitate a drastic reorganization of the infrastructures with
considerable economic and geopolitical consequences.
The policies to implement at international level must take explicitly into
account the intergenerational and interregional equity issues.
The magnitude of the changes that will be necessary impose the imple-
mentation of market-based instruments to limit the welfare losses of the
different parties (groups of consumers) involved.
The global anthropogenic climate change problem is now relatively well iden-
tified. The decision process which has to be implemented in order to solve it
must be adapted to the particular spatial and dynamic structure of the inter-
play between climate and economic dynamics. As exemplified by the difficulties
of the Kyoto protocol39, viable policy options will have to be designed as equi-
librium solutions to dynamic games played by different groups of nations. The
paradigm of dynamic games is particularly well suited to represent the conflict
of a set of economic agents (here the nations) involved jointly in the control
of a complex dynamical system (the climate), over a very long time horizon,
with distributed and highly unequal costs and benefits. Already many papers
have proposed such an approach (Carraro and Filar, 1995). The time has come
to construct models based on a more precise description of climate dynamics;
the economic response to the need for drastic mitigation actions; the costs in-
curred by the different regions, and the possibility of integrating mitigation
policies within an incentive for clean development. Some dynamic games in-
volving detailed economic descriptions of the consequences of climate change
policies have recently been proposed ((Haurie and Viguier, 2003; Bernard et al.,
2002; Viguier et al., 2004)). In another vein a game-theoretic approach to the
long-term dynamic management of the world energy system has been sketched
out (Labriet and Loulou, 2003).
In this book the papers by Carraro and Kemfert address specifically, in a
dynamic game setting, the issue of linkage between development or R&D and
mitigation policies. The other papers gathered in this book are a contribution
to the identification of the parameters that could define the models that will
be required.
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